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a b s t r a c t
In this paper we demonstrate how to prove the correctness of
systems implemented using low-level imperative features like
pointers, files, and socket I/Owith respect to high level I/O protocol
descriptions by using the Coq proof assistant. We present a web-
based course gradebook application developed with Ynot, a Coq
library for verified imperative programming. We add a dialog-
based I/O system to Ynot, and we extend Ynot’s underlying Hoare
logic with event traces to reason about I/O and protocol behavior.
Expressive abstractions allow themodular verification of both high
level specifications like privacy guarantees and low level properties
like data structure pointer invariants.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In an ideal world, web services would be specified with high-level concepts and protocols, and
implementations would be proven correct with respect to these specifications. Indeed, there is
already much work on verifying web systems at a variety of levels of abstraction. For example,
there are formal cryptographic protocols (Abadi and Gordon, 1997), session type-systems for protocol
conformance (Honda et al., 2008), taint-analyses for protecting from code injection attacks (Huang
et al., 2004), and tools for automatically generating low-level data marshaling code (Curbera et al.,
2002). Given the wealth of knowledge about how to verify particular semantic properties, a natural
next step is to verify arbitrary properties, or even all properties of interest (functional correctness).
In this paper we present a full-spectrum approach to this problem for programs that use general
recursion, mutable state, and file and socket I/O. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by
building, with minimal overhead, a web-based course gradebook with verified properties ranging
from privacy guarantees to data structure pointer invariants.
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We use the Coq proof assistant (Bertot and Castéran, 2004) to state specifications, create
implementations, and build proofs. The richness of Coq (and systems like it (Norell, 2007; McBride
andMcKinna, 2004)) enables modular specifications and compositional implementations at arbitrary
and varying levels of abstraction. As a result, we can verify both high-level properties (protocol
conformance, privacy guarantees, etc.) and low-level properties (data structure invariants, parsing
correctness, etc.) in the same tool. Our trusted code base is small, since proofs can be independently
and quickly checked by a small type-checker. In this workwe have opted to create proofs interactively
and semi-automatically during development, using Coq’s proof scripting language (Delahaye, 2000),
but our approach does not preclude external automation (e.g., using automated theorem provers to
discharge proof obligations (Zee et al., 2008)).
In addition to Coq, we are using the Ynot (Nanevski et al., 2008) library for verified, general-
purpose, higher-order imperative programming inside Coq.We add a dialog-based (Jones andWadler,
1993) I/O system to Ynot, and we extend Ynot’s underlying Hoare logic with event traces (Bloom
et al., 1995) to reason about I/O behavior. Executable programs are generated by compiling OCaml
code extracted from Coq sources and statically linking it with an OCaml implementation of the Ynot
axioms (Chlipala et al., 2009). During this process, non-computational content such as specifications
andproofs are erased, andYnot references are compiled toOCaml references, greatly reducing runtime
overhead.
Verifying the functional correctness of realistic programs has been a grand challenge in computer
science since the 1970’s (Leino, 2010). Our work here demonstrates, through a complete example, the
engineering costs and benefits associated with the functional verification of a simple 3-tiered web
application, using Coq as a programming and proving environment. Our approach is unique (and,
we believe, compelling) in combining an extremely expressive, Turing-complete dependently typed
programming language with aggressive proof automation for a trace- and separation-based Hoare
logic. Other approaches are discussed in Section 6.
1.1. The gradebook application
Our web-based course gradebook allows students, teaching assistants, and professors the ability
to read, edit, and statistically aggregate grades in a web-browser in a privacy-respecting way. We use
a traditional three-tiered web application architecture with role-based privacy, a persistent backend
data store, an application logic layer, and a presentation component (Naumovich and Centonze, 2004).
A diagram of the application is shown in Fig. 1.
We specify the store using a purely functional implementation of a minimal subset of SQL,
including basic select, project, update, insert, and delete commands. We have implemented an
imperative store using a pointer-based data structure, but this detail is isolated from the rest of the
system by higher-order separation logic (Reynolds, 2002; O’Hearn et al., 2001).
The application logic specifies the behavior of the gradebook using high-level domain-specific
concepts like grades, assignments, and sections, and defines the protocol that makes up a valid web
transaction. For example, the specification states that students cannot query each other’s grades.
Imperative implementations are proven correct with respect to this model.
To users, the gradebook application appears as a regular HTML-based website. The application
server parses HTTP requests by compiling a PEG grammar (Ford, 2004) for HTTP to a packrat parsing
computation in a verified way (Mckinna and Wright, 2006).
1.2. Outline
We begin in Section 2with a brief introduction to the salient aspects of Coq that we leverage in our
development. This section is geared primarily for Coq novices and Coq experts should feel free to skip
this section. In Section 3 we describe how to use Coq and Ynot to specify and implement application
behaviors.We then present the verified gradebook application in Section 4, and discuss its verification
overhead. In Section 5 we discuss the extraction process that we use to generate executable code. We
concludewith a comparison to related tools, lessons learned, and thoughts on futurework. The source
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Fig. 1. The deployed gradebook application.
code is included in the Ynot distribution at http://ynot.cs.harvard.edu/. For purposes of exposition we
will sometimes take obvious notational liberties with Coq code.
2. Coq background
The Coq proof assistant, usually referred to simply as Coq, is a tool for constructing programs
and machine checkable proofs in the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC) (Bertot and Castéran,
2004). Coq is based on the Curry–Howard isomorphism which connects types to logical propositions
and well-founded functional programs to proofs in constructive logic. This tutorial focuses on three
concepts. First, we show how to define inductive data types. Next, we show how to define functions
over these data types and how reason about them. Finally, we discuss axiomatic extensions to Coq.
Oneway to define types in Coq is using inductive definitions. For example, the Coq standard library
defines natural numbers using the following inductive definition:
1 Inductive nat : Set :=
2 | O : nat
3 | S : nat→ nat
Here, the inductive type nat is a value of type Set; Set denotes the universe of types, and thus, nat is a
type. The code above defines two constructors for natural numbers. The first, on line two, states that
O is a natural number which we will consider to denote 0. The S constructor on line three states that
given any natural number n, S n is also a natural number, which we take to mean the successor of n,
i.e. n + 1. Using these constructors, we could write the number 3 as S (S (S O)), though Coq provides
notation that allows us to use Arabic numerals directly, e.g. 3.
We can use the same approach to define inductive predicates. For example, we can define two
mutually inductive predicates that encode when a number is even or odd:
1 Inductive Even : nat→ Prop :=
2 | EZero : Even 0
3 | ESucc : ∀ n, Odd n→ Even (S n)
4 with Odd : nat→ Prop :=
5 | OSucc : ∀ n, Even n→ Odd (S n).
The types of Even and Odd are nat→ Prop. This is the type of total functions from natural numbers to
logical propositions. Types in the universe Prop, unlike Set, are computationally irrelevant: they cannot
be used to construct values in Set. Such irrelevance allows proofs to be ignored at runtime.
Even n (and Odd n) are the types of proofs that n is even (or odd). The constructors for these data
types form the proof rules for a theory. EZero is the proof that states that 0 is even. ESucc (and OSucc)
is the proof rule that takes two arguments, a number n and a proof that n is odd (or even), and proves
that S n is even (or odd). Coq uses ∀ to denote a dependent function type where the type of the return
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value depends on the value of the argument. Note that n binds a variable whose type, nat, is inferred
by Coq.
Coq also provides a simple Definition keyword as shown in the following example:
1 Definition pair_nat : Set := nat ∗ nat.
2 Definition list_nat : Set := list nat.
The first line defines the type pair_nat to be the type of pairs of natural numbers using the pair type
constructor, ∗. Using built-in Coq notation, values of this typewould bewritten, e.g., (1, 2). The second
line uses the list type constructor to define a type of lists of natural numbers. In Coq, the empty list
is denoted nil while the non-empty list is denoted by :: . For example the list 1, 2, 3 would be written
1 :: 2 :: 3 :: nil .
So far we have considered only the definition of types and propositions, but not themechanism for
computing on values or proving propositions. Both of these tasks are accomplished using a strongly
normalizing (and total) functional programming language. The following three definitions are proofs
that the first three natural numbers are even, odd and even respectively. Here we use the keyword
Lemma to signify proofs, though this is simply an alias for Definition.
1 Lemma zero_is_even : Even 0 := EZero.
2 Lemma one_is_odd : Odd 1 := OSucc 0 zero_is_even.
3 Lemma two_is_even : Even 2 := ESucc 1 one_is_odd.
As is customary, placing two terms next to one another applies the first to the second. For example,
in the second lemma, the constructor OSucc is applied to two arguments, 0 and zero_is_even.
Since there is an infinite number of natural numbers, proofs about all naturals require induction.
Consider the proposition that all natural numbers are either even or odd:
1 Lemma even_or_odd : ∀ n, Even n ∨ Odd n.
Since we have written a definition without a corresponding body, Coq enters an interactive proving
mode to assist us in building it. Coq presents the following goal:
1 1 subgoal
2
3 ============================
4 ∀ n : nat, Even n ∨ Odd n
Our proof proceeds by induction on the value of n, which we can specify using the induction tactic. Coq
automatically generates an induction principle for every inductive definition; in our case, this tactic
applies the induction principle for natural numbers:
1 nat_ind : ∀ P : nat→ Prop,
2 P 0 → (∀ n : nat, P n→ P (S n))→∀ n : nat, P n
Applying the induction principle results in two new goals:
1 2 subgoals
2
3 ============================
4 Even 0 ∨ Odd 0
5
6 n : nat
7 IHn : Even n ∨ Odd n
8 ============================
9 Even (S n) ∨ Odd (S n)
We can prove the first goal by proving the left side of the disjunction and appealing to EZero. For the
second goal, we consider whether n is even or odd by performing a case analysis on IHn and then
appealing to either ESucc or OSucc to prove either Odd (S n) or Even (S n).
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At its core, this is the basic process that our verification technique; however, manually proving
goals can be tedious. To ease this burden, Coq provides a scripting language, Ltac (Delahaye, 2000), to
chain together tactics and create customized proof search heuristics that, in practice, can be used to
prove many goals. Custom tactics produce Coq terms and are essential to making the verification cost
of our approach manageable; we return to this point in Section 3.5.
Sometimes it is desirable or necessary to axiomatize data types and operations, rather than define
them outright in Coq. Coq provides the Axiom keyword that we can use, for example, to axiomatize
real arithmetic2:
1 Axiom real : Set.
2 Axiom real_plus : real→ real→ real.
3 Axiom real_plus_comm : ∀ a b, real_plus a b = real_plus b a.
Herewe axiomatize real and real_pluswhich are respectively the type of real numbers and the addition
over real numbers.Wemay use these two axioms towrite programswith real addition, but in order to
reason about our programs, we need various properties. On line three we show one such a property,
that real_plus is commutative. In the rest of the paper, we use axioms as the basis for imperative
programming in Coq. Using axioms, rather than Coq definitions, allows us to extract efficient code
from our imperative Coq programs; this is discussed in Section 5.
3. Trace-based verification of imperative programs
We begin by discussing how we define traces in Coq in Section 3.1 and use them to specify
the protocol for a simple echo server. We then discuss how to build programs that meet a trace-
based specification in Section 3.2 by implementing our echo server. In Section 3.3 we extend
our specifications and implementations to operations over the heap, using a counter and pointer-
swapping example. We then show how to enforce modularity in Section 3.4, giving an example
abstract interface for a counter. We follow up in Section 3.5 by combining the counter with the echo
server to obtain an echo server that uses memory to maintain an internal counter of howmany times
it has echoed anything; in this section we also walk-through the human–computer interaction to
discharge the generated verification conditions. We conclude in Section 3.6 by describing how more
complex protocols can be composed from simpler ones.
3.1. Traces
We begin by defining traces (Bloom et al., 1995) in Coq. The first primitive in our library is a socket
address:
1 Axiom SockAddr : Set.
2 Axiom compare_sockaddr : SockAddr→ SockAddr→ bool.
3 ...
This axiom tells Coq that there exists an abstract type (a Set, in Coq parlance) of SockAddrs. An
alternative is to define socket addresses within Coq, for example as a pair of tuples (32-bit IP address,
16-bit port) of natural numbers:
1 Definition SockAddr : Set := (nat ∗ nat ∗ nat ∗ nat) ∗ (nat ∗ nat).
2 ...
We prefer to keep socket addresses abstract, and to explicitly axiomatize the behavior we require
from them (that they can be decidably compared, etc). Doing so keeps our assumptions about how the
underlying operating system implements sockets to a minimum. In the same way, we also introduce
an abstract type of Events that intuitively corresponds to input and output events:
2 Coq’s standard library includes a more complete, non-axiomatized formulation of real arithmetic.
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1 Axiom Event : Set.
2 Axiom Sent : SockAddr→ SockAddr→ string→ Event.
3 Axiom Recd : SockAddr→ SockAddr→ string→ Event.
4 ...
In this paper we will mostly focus on networking Events, but we also include Events for file I/O. For
simplicity, we will focus on UDP events, but we have also axiomatized TCP events.
As with SockAddrs, we could define Events rather than treating them axiomatically:
1 Inductive Event : Set :=
2 | Sent : SockAddr→ SockAddr→ string→ Event
3 | Recd : SockAddr→ SockAddr→ string→ Event
4 ...
However, leaving Event abstract means that Events form an open type (Lőh and Hinze, 2006), so
that users of our library can define additional I/O events without needing to modify the definition of
Event. On the other hand, using an axiomatization like ours means that it is more complicated to
perform an explicit case analysis on Events.
We next define Traces to be a finite lists of Events:
1 Definition Trace := list Event.
Even though our Traces are finite, we can still express programs that run forever by using a recursion
primitive (Section 3.6). We will be using inductive predicates to specify the acceptable sets of traces
for our applications. For example, we define the set of acceptable traces for our echo server running
using a local socket (local) as:
1 Inductive echoes (local : SockAddr) : Trace→ Prop :=
2 | NilEchoes : echoes local nil
3 | ConsEchoes : ∀ remote s past, echoes local past→
4 echoes local (Sent local remote s :: Recd local remote s :: past).
This definition expresses that the empty trace is allowable (NilEchoes), and that if some trace past
is allowable, then additionally echoing back a single request is also allowable (ConsEchoes). An
alternative approachwould be to usemore sophisticated techniques, like temporal logics (Clarke et al.,
1986), which we could define using parameterized Coq propositions.
3.2. Imperative programs
We build implementations of our trace-based specifications using the Ynot library for Coq. We
provide a library of networking commands that correspond to our primitive Events which users
can use to build larger programs. The types of these commands use Traces to describe the effects
that the commands have on I/O. Commands (also called imperative computations) have Cmd types;
Cmd is analogous to the IOmonad in Haskell and is indexed by pre- and post-conditions as in Hoare
Type Theory (Nanevski et al., 2006). In general, pre- and post-conditions can refer to the program’s
current trace and state of the heap; the post-condition is written as a function over the return value.
Heaps themselves have type heap. We provide primitive commands to send a string along a socket
connection, and to receive (recv) a string along a socket connection; the interface is given in Fig. 2.
The tr argument in the type of send is wrapped in [ ] braces to indicate that tr
is computationally irrelevant, and should be erased by the compiler when an executable is
generated. Explicitly marking arguments with braces drastically decreases the runtime overhead for
verification—it would not be efficient to actually pass around the program trace at runtime. One
minor side-effect of this way of marking computational irrelevance is that irrelevant variables must
be explicitly unpacked inside pre- and post-conditions, here indicated with a double tilde ~~; outside
the double tilde, tr has type [Trace]; inside tr has type Trace. This explicit unpacking ensures
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Fig. 2. The networking interface.
that the Coq type checker will prevent irrelevant parameters from being used to influence runtime
behavior. Further details can be found in our previous work on Ynot (Chlipala et al., 2009).
The assertions that index a Cmd connect our programs to their specifications. For example, the type
of imperative commands that conform to the previously defined echo protocol is:
1 Definition echo_iter_t local : Set := ∀ (tr : [Trace]),
2 Cmd (tr ˜ ˜ traced tr ∗ [echoes local tr])
3 (fun _ : unit ⇒ tr ˜ ˜ ∃ r : Trace,
4 traced (r ++ tr) ∗ [echoes local (r ++ tr )]).
The [] notation in the pre- and post-conditions is overloaded here to indicate ‘‘pure’’ propositions
that do not mention the heap. The * denotes the separating conjunction that we will explain in more
detail in the next section. For now, the reader can consider it as similar to the standard classical
conjunction. List concatenation is written ++. The ∃ r : Trace construct existentially quantifies variable
r of type Trace. It is easy to see that this function’s type guarantees that it respects (preserves) the
echoes predicate (invariant) on Traces that we defined earlier. As such, any computation of this
type when repeated forever (starting from an allowable initial state), is a correct implementation
of an echo server. We can build an implementation of one echo iteration using the send and recv
primitives, in a style that looks much like Haskell:
1 Definition echo (local : SockAddr) : echo_iter_t local.
2 refine (fun local tr ⇒
3 x ← recv local tr <@> _ ;
4 {{ send local (fst x) (snd x) ( tr ˜ ˜ ˜
5 (Recd local (fst x) (snd x) :: tr )) <@> _ }} );
6 (∗∗ Proof ∗∗)
7 rsep fail auto.
8 Qed.
As in Haskell, commands are sequenced through monadic binding. Intuitively, binding two
computations c1 and c2means running c1 and then running c2 using the result of c1 as input: we
write this as v ← c1; c2, and asc1 ;; c2whenc1’s output is ignored. Binding requires us to prove that
the pre-condition of c2 is a logical consequence of the post-condition of c1. Wewill defer a discussion
of how the correctness of this code is proved until later (Section 3.5), but for now note that we write
imperative code first and then prove correctness afterward. The {{-}} on lines 4–5 indicates that
the type of the final send may need its pre-condition strengthened and its post-condition weakened
to match the overall type of echo_iter_t. In this example, the Coq tactic refine generates proof
obligations that are all solved by a call to tactic rsep fail auto. The Proof and Qed statements delineate
the proof script from the definition.
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We have written out the intermediate state of the trace history (the fourth argument to send)
using an irrelevant value unpacking operation ~~~, similar to ~~, but such states can often be inferred.
Finally, the <@> _ notation corresponds to a use of separation logic’s frame rule in which the framed
heap is inferred. We will discuss this in more detail when we introduce how to reason about the heap
in the next section.
3.3. Memory
In addition to performing I/O, Ynot programs can also manipulate memory. Heap memory is
accessed through the traditional new, read, write, and free commands that we reason about using
separation logic (Reynolds, 2002; O’Hearn et al., 2001). The notation p → v represents the hprop
that the pointer (ptr) p points to v in the given heap. The memory commands have types:
1 Definition SepNew (T : Set) (v : T) : Cmd empty (fun p⇒ p → v).
2
3 Definition SepFree (T : Set) (p : ptr) :
4 Cmd (∃ v : T, p → v) (fun _ : unit⇒ empty).
5
6 (∗ SepRead is also written ! ∗)
7 Definition SepRead (T : Set) (p : ptr) (P : T→ hprop) :
8 Cmd (∃ v : T, p → v ∗ P v) (fun v⇒ p → v ∗ P v).
9
10 (∗ SepWrite is also written ::= ∗)
11 Definition SepWrite (T T’ : Set) (p : ptr) (v : T’) :
12 Cmd (∃ v’ : T, p → v’) (fun _ : unit⇒ p → v).
For example, when SepNew is run in the empty heap with argument v, it returns a pointer3 to v.
SepFree is the inverse: it takes a valid pointer and frees it, hence the post-condition is the empty
heap. Note that SepFree’s type does not mean that the entire heap is empty, only that the portion
of the heap referred to by the pre-condition is empty — this is a characteristic of the small-footprint
approach of separation logic. Pointers in Ynot are not explicitly typed, so the SepWrite function
allows changing the type of the value pointed to by P. The * is separation logic conjunction, indicating
that the heap can be split into two disjoint portions that satisfy each conjunct. SepRead’s type
indicates that to readp,pmust point to somev; the additional parameterP can beused to dependently
describe the heap around p, and P is passed v as an argument.
For example, the following program swaps the values of two pointers:
1 Definition swap (p1 p2 : ptr) (n1 n2: [nat]) :
2 Cmd ( n1 ~~ n2 ~~ p1 → n1 ∗ p2 → n2)
3 (fun _ : unit ⇒ n1 ~~ n2 ~~ p1 → n2 ∗ p2 → n1).
4 refine (fun p1 p2 n1 n2⇒
5 v1← ! p1 <@> (n2 ~~ p2 → n2);
6 v2← ! p2 <@> _ ;
7 p1 ::= v2 ;;
8 {{ p2 ::= v1 }});
9 (∗∗ Proof ∗∗)
10 sep inst auto.
11 Qed.
The type of swap expresses that swap takes as arguments two pointers p1, p2 and two
computationally irrelevant natural numbers n1, n2 such that p1 points to n1 and p2 points to n2.
If swap terminates, then p1will point to n2 and p2will point to n1.
The swap function itself is similar to a typical pointer-swapping function but includes extra
information to help us prove partial correctness. As we stated before, refine generates proof
3 Ynot does not allow pointer arithmetic, so pointers are essentially references.
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obligations, that we discharge using Ynot’s built in separation logic tactic, using a call to
sep inst auto (Chlipala et al., 2009). We will once again defer describing this process, delaying it until
we have seen an example with non-trivial obligations (Section 3.5). The <@> is a use of separation
logic’s frame rule, which allows us to describe the portion of the heap that a computation does not
use. In this example, for instance, we need to know a framing condition that p2 points to n2 before and
after p1 is read. This fact can actually be inferred automatically (and a similar condition is inferred on
the next line), but we write it out here for sake of explanation.
The memory correctness properties of our implementation, such as absence of null pointer
dereferences and memory leaks, are statically guaranteed at compile-time by the proofs required to
invoke the Sep commands. For example, consider the following erroneous program:
1 Definition leak : Cmd empty (fun _ : unit⇒ empty).
2 refine (v ← SepNew 1 ; {{ Return tt }}).
3 Proof.
Because the heap contains 1 after the call to New but the return type of leak states that the heap
should be empty, refine generates the false obligation that a heap in which v points to 1 is also a
heap that is empty:
1 v → 1H⇒ empty
We obtain a similar behavior with traces — if we try to give a command an erroneous trace, solving
the proof obligations will fail.
3.4. Modularity
We achieve modularity in Ynot by defining abstract interfaces for imperative components. This is
essential for reasoning about larger programs in a compositionalway. Consider the following interface
and implementation of a simple stateful counter with an increment function, inc:
1 Module Type Counter.
2 Parameter T : Set. (∗ hidden type of implementation ∗)
3 Definition M := nat. (∗ public definition of the logical model ∗)
4 Parameter rep : T→M→ hprop. (∗ hidden heap representation ∗)
5
6 (∗ hidden implementation ∗)
7 Parameter inc : ∀ (t : T) (m : [M]),
8 Cmd (m ~~ rep t m) (fun _ : unit⇒m ~~ rep t (m + 1)).
9 End Counter.
10
11 Module CounterImpl : Counter.
12 Definition T := ptr.
13 Definition rep (t : T) (m : M) := t →m.
14 ...
15 End CounterImpl.
Here, the T parameter is the hidden type of the implementation, which corresponds to a pointer in the
CounterImpl implementation. M is the exposed logical model for the data structure, in this case a
natural number that is the current value in the counter. Therep parameter relates, through anhprop,
the state of the imperative implementation to the logical model. The Module Type hides everything
except the logical model, providing an abstraction barrier for users of the module. This is a classic
example of an Abstract Data Type (Liskov and Zilles, 1975).
3.5. Example: A counting echo server
We can use the Counter module to implement a counting echo server. As is typical, we begin by
defining a trace-based specification:
104 G. Malecha et al. / Journal of Symbolic Computation 46 (2011) 95–118
1 Inductive echoes (local: SockAddr) : nat→ Trace→ Prop :=
2 | NilEchoes : echoes local 0 nil
3 | ConsEchoes : ∀ remote s past n str, echoes local n past→
4 str = (ntos n ++ " : ") ++ s→
5 echoes local (n + 1)
6 (Sent local remote str :: Recd local remote s :: past).
This definition is similar to the plain echoes definition given before except that each trace is indexed
by a natural number that corresponds to the number of echoes that have occurred. This number
increases on each iteration.
The type of imperative computations that implement one iteration of this specification is:
1 Definition echo_iter_t local (cnt : Counter.t) ( i : [nat]) : Set :=
2 ∀ (tr: [Trace]),
3 Cmd (i~~ tr ~~ traced tr ∗ [echoes local i tr ] ∗ Counter.rep cnt i)
4 (fun _:unit ⇒ i ~~ tr ~~ ∃ r : Trace,
5 Counter.rep cnt (i + 1) ∗ traced (r ++ tr) ∗
6 [echoes local (i + 1) (r ++ tr )]).
We can easily implement a computation that corresponds to this type 4:
1 Definition echo (local: SockAddr) (cnt : Counter.t) (i : [nat]) :
2 echo_iter_t local cnt i .
3 refine (fun local cnt i tr ⇒
4 x ← recv local tr <@> _ ;
5 n← Counter.get cnt i <@> _ ;
6 Counter.inc cnt i <@> _ ;;
7 {{ send local (fst x) (( str2la (ntos n ++ " : ")) ++ snd x)
8 ( tr ~~~ (Recd local ( fst x) (snd x) :: tr )) <@> _ }});
9 (∗∗ Proof ∗∗)
10 rsep fail auto. (∗ solves 7 of 8 obligations ∗)
11 sep fail auto; simplr.
Unlike our previous examples, the proof obligations generated by the counting echo sever are non-
trivial. A detailed discussion of how to discharge obligations effectively can be found in Chlipala et al.
(2009); herewe simplywant to give a flavor for howproving proceeds. The use of refine generates 8
subgoals, 7 ofwhich can be discharged completely automatically by the tactic invocation rsep fail auto.
After further simplification using sep fail auto and simplr, we are left with the following, somewhat
messy, goal:
1 local : SockAddr
2 cnt : Counter.t
3 x : SockAddr ∗ string
4 v : unit
5 x0 : Trace
6 x1 : nat
7 H3 : echoes local x1 x0
8 UP1 : UnpackAs (list Event) [Recd local (fst x) (snd x) :: x0]
9 (Recd local (fst x) (snd x) :: x0)
10 UP0 : UnpackAs nat [x1] x1
11 UP : UnpackAs Trace [x0] x0
12 H : x1 = x1
13 H0 : echoes local x1 x0
14 ============================
4 The str2la function converts strings to lists of characters and is defined using a simple Coq function.
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15 emptyH⇒
16 [echoes local (x1 + 1)
17 ((Sent local ( fst x) (ntos x1 ++ " : " ++ snd x)
18 :: Recd local (fst x) (snd x) :: nil ) ++ x0)]
Here we can see that hypothesis and variable names are machine-generated, as is common in
automated proving. This obligation is stated as an assertion in separation logic: in an environment
where echoes local x1 x0 holds, and the heap is empty, it must also be the case that the echoes
predicate holds on the trace extended by x. This is true by definition of our echoes predicate, and we
finish the proof by lifting the pure hprop echoes (using cut_pure) and applying standard Coq tactics to
reason:
1 simpl; cut_pure; constructor; eauto.
2 Qed.
The naïvely printed proof is two thousand lines long, but can be machine-checked almost
instantaneously.
3.6. Application servers
Many web systems, including our gradebook server, can be structured as computations that an
application server executes repeatedly. Such web applications can be programmed using event loops
in the style of dialogs (Jones and Wadler, 1993). At a minimum, an application iteration is defined
by a progress-making, invariant-preserving Ynot command that is runnable in the initial world of an
empty heap and empty trace:
1 Definition server_t ( I : Trace→ hprop)(pf_startable: I nil empty):=
2 ∀ (tr: [Trace]),
3 Cmd (tr ~~ traced tr ∗ I tr )
4 (fun r :[ Trace]⇒ r ~~ tr ~~ traced (r ++ tr) ∗
5 I (r ++ tr) ∗ [r <> nil ]).
We have implemented a number of UDP, TCP, and SSL application servers. In each case their types
ensure that they only run applications that preserve some notion of partial correctness. The simplest,
the forever server, repeats a given computation forever. The implementation of forever is half a
dozen lines, does not require a single line of manual proof, and includes the post-condition that the
server never halts (the post-condition includes [False]):
1 Definition forever : ∀ (I : Trace→ hprop)
2 (B : ∀ t’, Cmd (t’ ~~ traced t’ ∗ I t ’)
3 (fun t ’’:[ Trace]⇒ t’ ~~ t’’ ~~
4 traced (t ’’ ++ t ’) ∗ I ( t ’’ ++ t ’)))
5 ( t ’ : [Trace]),
6 Cmd (t’ ~~ traced t’ ∗ I t ’)
7 (fun _:Empty_set⇒ t’ ~~ Exists t’’ :@ Trace,
8 traced (t ’’ ++ t ’) ∗ I ( t ’’ ++ t ’) ∗ [False]).
9
10 refine (fun I B t ’ ⇒
11 Fix (fun t ⇒ t ~~ traced t ∗ I t)
12 (fun t (_:Empty_set)⇒ t ~~ Exists t’’ :@ Trace,
13 traced (t ’’ ++ t) ∗ I ( t ’’ ++ t) ∗ [False])
14 (fun self t ⇒
15 tr ’ ← B t;
16 {{ self ( tr ’ ~~ t’ ~~ tr ’ ++ t) }}
17 ) t ’);
18 (∗∗ Proof ∗∗)
19 sep fail auto.
20 Qed.
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Fig. 3. Structure of the HTTP server.
Fig. 4. Gradebook control flow.
Ynot allows non-terminating recursion with an explicit Fix command shown on line 11. Since
recursion invariants are generally not inferable, Fix takes the pre- and post-condition of the loop, lines
11 and 12, in addition to the function body, lines 14–16.
We have also implemented a generic HTTP server, that strips HTTP headers and passes the content
on to applications. Its implementation is sketched in Fig. 3, and wewill use it to deploy our gradebook
application, discussed in the next section.
4. The gradebook application
In this section we describe the gradebook application specification, our imperative implemen-
tation, and the proof that the implementation meets the specification. We begin with the purely
functional specification of the gradebook itself (Section 4.1).We then describe the entire deployed ap-
plication server starting from the backend and working toward the user. We start with the data store
(Section 4.2) which provides the data manipulation operations we use in our imperative implemen-
tation (Section 4.3). From there, we show how the application can be deployed using our application
server (Section 4.4). We conclude with an explanation of the frontend (Section 4.5) in which we focus
on parsing user requests. It is helpful to keep in mind that every imperative component is related to
a purely functional model to facilitate compositionality. A diagram showing the control flow of the
gradebook is shown in Fig. 4.
4.1. Application logic
In this sectionwedefine the specification of our application.Webegin bydefining the configuration
of a course:
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1 Definition ID := nat.
2 Definition Section := nat.
3 Definition PassHash := nat.
4 Definition Grade := nat.
5 Definition Assignment := nat.
6 Record Config : Set := mkCfg {
7 students, tas, profs : list ID;
8 sections : list (ID ∗ Section );
9 hashes : list (ID ∗ PassHash);
10 maximums : list Grade
11 }.
We are using natural numbers for our basic types, but abstract types can also be used. Configurations
are specified to have a number of properties; for example, all students, teaching assistants and
professors must have a password and each student must belong to exactly one section. These
properties are given by a Coq definition:
1 Definition correct_cfg (cfg : Config) := ∀ id,
2 (In id (students cfg) ∨ In id (tas cfg) ∨ In id (profs cfg)→
3 ∃ hash, lookup id (hashes cfg) = Some hash) ∧ ...
The actual grades aremodeled by a list (ID * list Grade). Aswith the configuration, we define
a predicate gb_inv to ensure the integrity of the grade data. Among other things, this specifies that
grade lists must always be the length of themaximums list given in the configuration, each grade must
be less than or equal to the associated maximum permissible, and each student must have an entry.
The gradebook application manages a single course by processing user requests, updating the
grades if necessary, and returning a response. The available commands are given by a Coq data type:
1 Inductive Request : Set :=
2 | SetGrade : ID→ PassHash→ ID→ Assignment→ Grade→ Request
3 | GetGrade : ID→ PassHash→ ID→ Assignment→ Request
4 | Average : ID → PassHash→ Assignment→ Request.
The meaning of a request is given by a pure Coq function mutate that maps a Request, Config,
and list (ID * list Grade) to a new list (ID * list Grade) and one of the following
responses:
1 Inductive Response : Set :=
2 | ERR_NOTPRIVATE : Response | ERR_BADGRADE : Response
3 | OK : Response | RET : Grade→ Response
4 | ERR_NOINV : Response
The first four response types correspond to actual responses in the program. The application should
return ERR_NOTPRIVATE if the request does not respect the privacy policy and ERR_BADGRADE if
the user requests the grade for an assignment that does not exist. We use OK to denote a successful
update and RET to return a value to the user in response to a GetGrade or Average request.
The fifth response type, ERR_NOINV, simplifies our definition of the mutate function. Technically,
mutate is partial, i.e. it is only meaningful when the gradebook invariant gb_invs holds on the
gradebook data. ERR_NOINV is the default return value that we use when mutate is applied to
data that does not represent a gradebook. In our implementation we prove that our gradebook
implementation always respects gb_inv, but ‘‘over-defining’’ mutate in this way makes it easier to
use with our other components. The full specification is given in Fig. 5.
The function private is meant to decide whether or not a given request respects the privacy policy.
By guarding the body ofmutatewith theprivate test, it is easy to see that our specification enforces
privacy. However we can also easily prove properties about our policy to reassure ourselves that we
encoded it correctly.
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Fig. 5. The functional specification of the gradebook application.
Fig. 6. Gradebook privacy policy.
Privacy is enforced using role based access control described by the table in Fig. 6. The policy is
defined by the Coq predicate private also given in Fig. 6.
We have proven a number of theorems about our specification, for example thatmutate preserves
gb_inv and do not return ERR_NOINVwhen gb_inv holds. To help make the proofs more tractable,
we implemented a number of automated proof search tactics tailored to this model.
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4.2. Data store
The backend data store of the gradebook server is a simplified relational database. We first give a
functional specification of the store, and then prove that our imperative implementation meets this
specification. Logically, a Store is modeled by a list of Tuple n defined by the following Coq data
type:
1 Fixpoint Tuple (n: nat) : Set :=
2 match n with
3 | 0 ⇒ unit
4 | S n’ ⇒ (nat ∗ Tuple n’)
5 end.
6 Definition Table n : Set := list (Tuple n).
For simplicity our data values are only natural numbers, and we specify only a small subset of the
functionality of SQL, including select, update, project, and delete. For example, selection is modeled
logically by:
1 Definition WHERE := Tuple n→ bool. (∗ ‘‘where’’ clause ∗)
2
3 Fixpoint select (wh : WHERE) (rows : Table) : Table :=
4 match rows with
5 | nil ⇒ nil
6 | a :: r ⇒ if wh a then a :: select wh r else select wh r
7 end.
Our purely functional model has expected properties, such as:
1 Theorem select_correct : ∀ tbl tbl’ wh, select wh tbl = tbl’→
2 (∀ tpl, wh tpl = true→ (In tpl tbl’↔ In tpl tbl).
Our store loads grade data when the application starts, and saves grade data when the application
stops. Starting and stopping is straightforward, so we do not discuss them in more detail.
Correctness of persistence is reflected in the store interface by the requirement that serialization and
deserialization are inverses:
1 Parameter serial : Table n→ string.
2 Parameter deserial : string → option (Table n).
3 Parameter serial_deserial : ∀ (tbl : Table n),
4 deserial ( serial tbl ) = Some tbl.
5
6 Parameter serialize : ∀ (r : t ) (m : [Table n]),
7 Cmd (m ~~ rep r m)
8 (fun str :string ⇒m ~~ rep r m ∗ [str = serial m]).
9
10 Parameter deserialize : ∀ (r : t) (s : string ),
11 Cmd (rep r nil)
12 (funm : option [Table n]⇒
13 matchm with
14 | None⇒ rep r nil ∗ [None = deserial s]
15 | Some m⇒m ~~ rep r m ∗ [Some m = deserial s]
16 end).
We have implemented the store using an abstract list which has several possible implementations,
including a C-style linked-list. The higher-order nature of Ynot makes it easy to express our store
operations using the list’s effectful fold operation.
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4.3. Verified implementation
Based on the specification given in Section 4.1, a verified implementation of our gradebook meets
the following interface:
1 Module Type GradeBookAppImpl.
2 Parameter T : Set.
3 Parameter rep : T→ (Config ∗ list (ID ∗ (list Grade)))→ hprop.
4
5 Parameter exec : ∀ (t : T) (cmd : Request)
6 (m : [Config ∗ list (ID ∗ ( list Grade))]),
7 Cmd (m ~~ rep t m ∗ [gb_inv (snd m) (fst m) = true])
8 (fun r : Response⇒m ~~ [r = fst (mutate cmd m)] ∗
9 rep t (snd (mutate cmd m)) ∗
10 [gb_inv (snd m) (fst m) = true]).
11 End GradeBookAppImpl.
Note that the type guarantees that any implementation of exec is invariant preserving and faithfully
models mutate. For convenience, we keep the course configuration in memory at runtime, and
parameterize our implementation by an abstract backend store:
1 Module GradeBookAppStoreImpl (s : Store) : GradeBookAppImpl.
2 Definition T := (Config ∗ s.T).
3 (∗∗ ... ∗∗)
4 End GradeBookStoreImpl.
In trying to write rep, we immediately encounter an impedance mismatch between our logical
gradebook model (based on list (ID * list Grade)) and the table-based model of
the store (based on Tuples). Following the 3-tier web application model, we define an object-
relational mapping (Keller, 1997) between the domain-specific objects of students, grades, etc., and
the relational store:
1 Module GradesTableMapping.
2 Fixpoint Tuple2List’ n : Tuple n→ list Grade :=
3 match n as n return Tuple n→ list Grade with
4 | 0 ⇒ fun _⇒ nil
5 | S n⇒ fun x⇒ (fst x) :: (Tuple2List’ n (snd x))
6 end.
7
8 Definition Tuple2List n (x : Tuple (S n)) :=
9 match x with
10 | (id, gr) ⇒ (id, Tuple2List’ n gr)
11 end.
12
13 Fixpoint Table2List n (x : Table (S n)) : list (ID ∗ list Grade) :=
14 match x with
15 | nil ⇒ nil
16 | a :: b⇒ Tuple2List n a :: Table2List n b
17 end.
18 End GradesTableMapping.
The return annotation on line 3 expresses the relationship between n and the resulting type of the
match and is necessary for helping the Coq type checker. Other data models, such as with three-tuples
(id, assignment, grade), require different mappings, but, regardless of the choice of data model and
mapping, we must prove that the mapping is an isomorphism from the logical model to the data
model:
1 Theorem TblMTbl_id : ∀ l c, store_inv1 l c = true→
2 Table2List _ (List2Table l (length (totals c ))) = l .
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Isomorphism is actually an overly strong requirement, but it helps to simplify reasoning. The
store_inv1 predicate on line 1 captures when the isomorphism applies (e.g., when the length of
the store’s list of tuples is the same as the number of assignments).
With the mapping to the data model done, we can define the concrete imperative representation:
1 Definition rep (cfg, t ) (cfg ’, gb) :=
2 [cfg = cfg’] ∗ s.rep t (List2Table gb)
The imperative implementation consists of a runtime configurationcfg and a handle to an imperative
store t, which rep relates to the logical gradebook model. The rep predicate states that the runtime
configuration (cfg) is identical to the logical model’s configuration (cfg’), and that the imperative
gradebook’s state (t) is related to the logical model (List2Table gb) by the isomorphism we
defined previously. The complete imperative implementation consists of hundreds of lines of code,
proofs, and tactics, so we can only give highlights here. The implementation of retrieving a grade,
omitting some definitions, is:
1 Definition F_get user pass id assign m t :
2 Cmd (m ~~ rep t m ∗ [store_inv (snd m) (fst m) = true] ∗
3 [private ( fst t ) (GetGrade user pass id assign) = true])
4 (fun r : Response⇒m ~~ [store_inv (snd m) (fst m) = true] ∗
5 [r = fst (mutate (GetGrade user pass id assign) m)] ∗
6 rep t (snd (mutate (GetGrade user pass id assign) m))).
7 refine (fun user pass id assign m t⇒
8 res ← s.select (snd t) (get_query id (fst t))
9 (m ~~~ List2Table (snd m)
10 (length (totals ( fst t ))) ) <@> _ ;
11 match nthget assign res as R
12 return nthget assign res = R → _ with
13 | None⇒ fun pf⇒ {{ !!! }}
14 | Some w⇒ fun pf⇒
15 match w as w’ return w = w’→ _ with
16 | None⇒ fun pf2⇒ {{ Return ERR_BADGRADE }}
17 | Some w’⇒ fun pf2⇒ {{ Return (RET w’) }}
18 end (refl_equal _)
19 end (refl_equal _) );
20 (∗∗ Proof. ∗∗)
21 rsep fail auto.
The intuition here is that we first run a get_query over the store s (lines 8–10), which results in
a table res. Because the gradebook invariant holds, res contains a single tuple of the requested
student’s grades. nthget returns None if the input table is empty, so we mark this branch as
impossible (using the !!! command). We then project out the desired grade, returning an error if the
requested assignment does not exist. The proof script for this function is almost completely automated
and consists almost entirely of appeals to Ynot’s built-in separation logic tactic sep augmented with
heuristics that apply purely logical lemmas about the application model. For example, a typical proof
about the specification is:
1 Theorem GetGrade_private_valid : ∀ (T : Set) (x : Config ∗ T)
2 user pass id assign,
3 → store_inv (snd x) (fst x) = true
4 → private (fst x) (GetGrade user pass id assign) = true
5 → nthget assign (select (get_query id (fst x))
6 (List2Table (snd x) (length (totals ( fst x ))))) <> None.
This theorem states that if the get request is privacy-respecting:
1 private ( fst x) (GetGrade user pass id assign) = true
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and the invariant holds on the store:
1 store_inv (snd x) ( fst x) = true
then the student has a grade:
1 nthget assign (select (get_query id (fst x))
2 (List2Table (snd x) (length (totals ( fst x ))))) <> None
The other grade-manipulating operations are implemented analogously.
4.4. Deploying to an application server
To deploy our application using a read-parse-execute-pretty-print application server we have
developed we must wrap our implementation in an Appmodule:
1 Module Type App.
2 Parameter Q : Set. (∗∗ type of app’s input ∗)
3 Parameter R : Set. (∗∗ type of app’s output ∗)
4
5 Parameter T : Set. (∗∗ type of imperative app ∗)
6 ParameterM : Set. (∗∗ type of logical app model ∗)
7 Parameter rep : T→M→ hprop. (∗∗ representation invariant ∗)
8
9 (∗∗ the functional model of the application ∗)
10 Parameter func : Q→M→ (R ∗M).
11 Parameter appIO : Q→M→ (R ∗M)→ Trace.
12
13 (∗∗ the app implementation ∗)
14 Parameter exec : ∀ (t : T) (q : Q) (m : [M]) (tr : [Trace]),
15 Cmd (tr ~~ m ~~ rep t m ∗ traced tr)
16 (fun r : R⇒ tr ~~ m ~~ letm’ := snd (func q m) in
17 [r = fst (func q m)] ∗
18 rep t m’ ∗ traced (appIO q m (r,m’) ++ tr)).
This interface requires a functional application model (func), and allows the application to
transparently perform I/O operations by wrapping the desired sequence in the appIO trace. The
gradebook application only performs I/O on startup and shutdown, and so it meets this interface
trivially. (Of course, the application server itself performsmuchmore I/O.) The application server also
requires a parser and frontend that are defined by the following functions and are discussed in the
following subsection:
1 Parameter grammar : Grammar Q.
2 Parameter parser : parser_t grammar.
3 Parameter printer : R→ string.
4 Parameter err : parse_err_t→ string.
5 End App.
With these definitions in place, we can describe the traces of a correct application implementation,
which we do using an inductive data type in the same way we specified correctness for the counting
echo server (Section 3.5). Intuitively, either the input request parsed correctly, and the result was sent
to the application for processing and the response returned to the user, or the parse failed and an error
was returned; see Fig. 4.
4.5. Frontend
The frontend parses inputs into Requests and converts application Responses into text. For
example, we have implemented a raw-sockets frontend by straightforwardly parsing Requests
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Fig. 7. Screenshots of the gradebook running in Mozilla Firefox.
Fig. 8. Numbers of lines of different kinds of code in the imperative components.
and printing Responses. We have also implemented an HTML frontend as an application server
(transformer). Given an application, the HTML application server passes along certain HTTP fields to
the application and converts response to HTML output. Several screen shots of the web application
running with a minimal skin are given in Fig. 7. Here we use strings for user names, passwords and
assignments which the backend supports through a lookup table that we omitted in our presentation.
The HTTP server uses Ynot’s packrat PEG parser toolkit (Chlipala et al., 2009) to parse HTTP
requests. The parser is implemented as a verified compiler (Mckinna and Wright, 2006): given a
specification consisting of a PEG grammar and semantic actions, the parser creates an imperative
computation that, when run over an arbitrary imperative character stream, returns a result that agrees
with the specification. To make the parsing efficient, the generated parser uses the packrat algorithm
which implements a sophisticated caching strategy based on imperative hash tables to make the
parser efficient. By structuring this module as a compiler, we can use it to write custom parsers for a
wide variety of tasks.
4.6. Verification overhead
Fig. 8 describes the breakdown of proofs, specifications, and imperative code in our verified
components. The program code is Haskell-ish code that has a direct analog in the executed program
(e.g. F_get). Specs are model definitions but not proofs (e.g. gb_inv). Proofs counts all proofs (e.g.
select_just) and tactic definitions. Overhead gives the ratio of proofs to program code and the
time column indicates proof search and checking time on a 2 GHz Core 2 laptop with 2 GB RAM.
We have made no attempt to optimize any of these numbers. These totals do not include the base
Ynot tactics and data structures that we use, which include an imperative hash table, stream, and
segmented linked list.
The ratios of overhead vary, but the application stands out as having the largest proof burden.
This is primarily because we opted to directly reason about sets as permutation-equivalence classes
of ordered lists which have no duplicate elements, instead of using a set library like (Filliâtre and
Letouzey, 2004). As a result, details of our set implementation have complicated our proofs. We found
that in general, Ynot’s separation logic tactics were able to successfully isolate reasoning about the
heap, reducing the problem of verification to a straightforward but non-trivial Coq programming task.
For a more detailed discussion of engineering proofs with Ynot, see (Chlipala et al., 2009).
5. Extraction
Our axiomatic treatment of imperative commands facilitates reasoning but does not allow us to
actually run programs. In order to produce executable code, we must translate our Coq code into a
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runnable language in which we can realize our imperative axioms. Coq provides such an extraction
mechanism (Letouzey, 2003) for translating Coq code into OCaml, Haskell, and Scheme; in our work
we chose OCaml.
Coq extraction consumes well-typed Coq terms and produces OCaml terms. Because the Coq type
system is somuchmore expressive than the OCaml type system, extractionmakes heavy use of unsafe
casting, written Obj.magic. However, because we know that our Coq program is well-typed, and
hence ‘‘cannot go wrong’’, we know that all of these casts are actually safe.
Extraction produces OCaml code with calls to undefined functions that correspond to our axioms,
e.g. SepRead, SepWrite, etc. Therefore, in order to run our program, we must implement these
functions. The Ynot library declares 11 axioms for reasoning in the Cmdmonad. These are realized in
OCaml and reused for all Ynot developments that extract to OCaml. In OCaml, type variables always
have primes and type application places arguments before functions, so the type ’a F indicates the
type constructor F applied to type variable ’a:
1 type ’a axiom_ST = unit→ ’a
2
3 let axiom_STBind b k () = let v = b () in k v ()
4 let axiom_STReturn v () = v
5
6 let axiom_STContra () = failwith "ST Contradiction"
7
8 let axiom_STWeaken x = x
9 let axiom_STStrengthen x = x
10
11 (∗∗ ((a → (unit→ b))→ a→ (unit→ b))→ a→ (unit→ b) ∗∗)
12 let axiom_STFix f =
13 let rec fix a () = f fix a ()
14 in fix
15
16 type axiom_ptr = Obj.t ref
17
18 let axiom_STNew v () = ref (Obj.magic v)
19 let axiom_STFree p () = ()
20 let axiom_STRead p () = Obj.obj !p
21 let axiom_STWrite p v () = (p := Obj.repr v)
These axioms are defined at the non-separation logic (raw heap) level, and the corresponding
lower-level monad is called ST instead of Cmd. Ynot implements the Cmd monad on top of
the ST monad in Coq. Our Coq computations correspond to OCaml thunks, which are effectful
computations suspended inside of lambdas. The bind and return operations have standard
definitions. Contradiction is implemented by raising a runtime exception, but this operation can never
be called because the Coq axiom can only be used in provably dead code. Weaken and Strengthen
correspond to strengthening pre-conditions and weakening post-conditions, and they are no-ops
because they are only used to reason about correctness. The general-recursive Fix combinator has
the standard definition for a call-by-value language. Finally, we implement the heap operations using
OCaml references. Since Ynot pointers are untyped and support strong-update, we model ptr as a
reference to Obj.t which is OCaml’s equivalent to C’s void*. New returns a new reference and free
is a no-op since OCaml is garbage collected. Finally, Read and Write have standard definitions based
on reading and writing references in OCaml.
In addition to the Ynot core, our axiomatization of traces also requires an OCaml realization. We
need to give computational definitions for axioms involving files, server sockets, and UDP, TCP, and
SSL sockets. In total, this basis includes 23 definitions that are mostly modularly defined on top of our
file abstraction. The file abstraction provides basic operations, like read, write, flush, and close,
and are implemented for each type of file and persistent socket. The implementation for regular Unix
files is:
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1 (∗∗ File Interface ∗∗)
2 type file_descriptor = {
3 fd : Unix.file_descr;
4 read : unit → char option;
5 write : char→ unit→ unit;
6 flush : unit → unit;
7 close : unit → unit
8 }
9
10 let axiom_read _ _ fd () =
11 match fd.read () with
12 None → None
13 | Some r→ Some (ctoa r)
14 let axiom_write _ _ fd chr () = fd.write (atoc chr) ()
15 let axiom_flush _ _ fd = fd.flush
16 let axiom_close _ _ fd = fd.close
17
18 (∗∗ File Implementation ∗∗)
19 let file_read fd () =
20 let str = String.create 1 in
21 let len = Unix.read fd str 0 1 in
22 if len = 1 then Some (String.get str 0)
23 else None
24 let file_write fd c () =
25 let str = String.make 1 c in
26 let len = Unix.write fd str 0 1 in
27 assert (len = 1);
28 ()
29 let file_close fd () = Unix.close fd
30 let file_flush fd () = flush (Unix.out_channel_of_descr fd)
Having realized all of the required axioms, we can compile our code with the OCaml compiler.
The generated code derives its correctness from the Coq type checker, the Coq extractionmechanism,
the realization of the computational axioms just presented, the correctness of the OCaml compiler
and libraries (including the system calls that they use), and the soundness of our Ynot extensions.
While this is still a considerable amount of code to trust, it is also possible to verify these lower-level
components (Feng et al., 2008; Bishop et al., 2006). The soundness of the Ynot axioms is discussed
in Petersen et al. (2008).
6. Related work
6.1. Weaker notions of correctness
Our approach to building verified web systems is to prove them correct by construction at
development time. Alternatively, pre-existing applications can be verified to be free of certain errors
through static analysis. In Huang et al. (2004), for example, the authors rule out SQL injection
attacks for a large fragment of PHP using an information flow analysis to ensure that tainted
application inputs are never used in SQL queries. Their notion of correctness is the absence of certain
classes of errors; with Ynot we can prove correctness with respect to an arbitrary logical model
of application behavior, which may itself specify the absence of injection attacks. And although
we have specified our logical gradebook model in Coq, specifications can be developed using
special-purpose tools such as Alloy (Jackson, 2002). Moreover, in Ynot, reasoning is modular and
compositional: interfaces themselves guarantee correctness properties; in Huang et al. (2004), the
entire program must be analyzed. See Chlipala (2010) for a discussion of how a wide range of
correctness properties can be obtained with minimal effort using a dependent type theory such
as Coq.
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6.2. Alternative approaches to full verification
Interest in the full verification of higher-order imperative software has surged recently (Leino,
2010), and in this section we highlight several alternative verification methodologies and other
verified software case studies.
Jahob (Zee et al., 2008) is similar to Ynot. It allows users to write effectful Java code, which is
automatically verified against a programmer specified logical model by a combination of automated
theorem provers. Although Jahob is also based on a Hoare logic, it does not use separation logic for
reasoning about memory and requires a significantly larger trusted code base than Ynot. Moreover,
Jahob cannot be used to reason about I/O behavior. To the best of our knowledge, Jahob has never been
used to certify a system like ours.
The Isabelle/HOL (Nipkowet al., 2002) proof assistant can be used to verify higher-order imperative
programs. In Bulwahn et al. (2008), the authors verify an array-based checker for resolution proofs
and a bytecode verifier using an approach similar to our own. However, our work differs in
several key respects. First, our work in based on Hoare type theory, so the types of imperative
computations specify their behavior. Because Isabelle/HOL lacks dependent types, it is difficult to
parameterize a computation monad by pre- and post-conditions, and as a result, the authors must
use an explicit operational semantics to reason about imperative computations ‘‘after the fact’’. For
example, using Ynot notation, the type of a pointer-swapping function in Bulwahn et al. (2008) would
be:
1 swap : ptr→ ptr→ Cmd unit
Many of the correctness properties that come for free in Ynot, such as the prevention of array
indexing out of bounds, must be explicitly proved (without built-in support for separation logic) using
Isabelle/HOL. As such, if we are interested in these properties, more effort is required to establish
them, but if we are not interested in these properties, then in Isabelle/HOL we are not obligated to
prove them. Another key difference between (Bulwahn et al., 2008) and our work is the expressivity
of the underlying language and logic: the programming language of Bulwahn et al. (2008) is restricted
to storing first-order values in the heap and its logic cannot be used to reason about I/O behavior.
Ynot allows higher-order values and imperative computations to be stored in the heap; see Swierstra
(2009) for an approach that allows higher-order values, but not computations, to be stored in the
heap.
Isabelle/HOL has been used to verify a number of software systems. In Ridge (2009), the authors
verify a concurrent OCaml implementation of a distributed queue running the alternating bit protocol.
Their development is similar in spirit to ours, but differs in scale–our development is 800 lines of
code and 2000 lines of specification and proof, and the queue is 3000 lines of code and 3000 lines of
specification and proof. Our development can be verified in several minutes; the queue takes an hour.
Isabelle/HOL has also been used to verify the seL4 microkernel (Klein et al., 2009), but the verification
overhead is on the order of 20×, with a 200,000 line proof of correctness. A distinguishing feature of
Ynot is its focus on lightweight proof automation, for separation logic in particular, which is discussed
in Chlipala et al. (2009).
ACL2 (Kaufmann and Moore, 1997) is a first-order applicative language and proof assistant used
in a variety of industrial settings, often to verify hardware. Unlike Coq, ACL2 does not output
separately checkable proof terms (and hence has a larger trusted base than Coq). An extension of
ACL2, dubbed single-threaded objects (Boyer and Moore, 1999), allows one to write a restricted class
of imperative programs and reason about them as though they were purely functional. This allows
for large speed-ups when, e.g, lists may be destructively modified in place. Indeed, the motivation
for the single-threaded objects extension is to increase the speed of the prover, rather than allow
users to program in an unrestricted imperative style. Programs that use imperative state must obey
syntactic restrictions that guarantee that there is only one reference to any stateful object. It is
unclear if this methodology can be pushed to a setting as general as ours, but an extension to Ynot
that allows for ‘‘safe’’ computations (e.g., factorial) to be executed during type-checking would be
useful.
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6.3. Program derivation from specifications
Declarative networking (Loo et al., 2006) is an approach to building distributed systems by
generating them from protocol descriptions written in domain specific languages based on Prolog.
Realistic protocols written in this style are often remarkably concise, and they can also be reasoned
about using techniques from automated theorem proving Wang et al. (2009). Our extended Ynot is a
natural language choice for the code generated from such a system, as we could potentially prove that
properties that hold at the declarative protocol level continue to hold in the generated code. SeeWang
et al. (2009) for references on other approaches, besides theorem proving, to prove properties of
declarative networking specifications. A similar line of work aims to extract concurrent programs
from provable propositions in an extensional type theory (Bickford and Constable, 2003).
7. Conclusion
We learned a number of lessons in building our verified gradebook server. The first is the
importance of the logical specification of application behavior. An imperative algorithm will be
difficult to verify if its functional model is difficult to reason about. Although we have sketched the
specification of our gradebook server in this paper, the properties that our implementation guarantees
can only truly be understood by examining the Coq gradebook specification. Such guarantees also
depend on lower level specifications. For example, our networking library does not capture timeout,
retry, or filesystem behavior, making certain properties difficult or impossible to specify without
modifying the I/O library. And because Hoare logic only captures partial correctness, the divergent
computation is a verified implementation of every specification.
One possible future direction is to further refine the I/O library to take additional behaviors
into account. Another direction is to integrate the gradebook with a more realistic relational
database (Malecha et al., 2009). Finally, our server is single threaded but concurrency can be added to
separation logic (Brookes, 2007) and transactions can also be considered (Nanevski et al., 2008).
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